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Violence, communication, and civil disobedience
Andreas Marcou
School of Law, University of Central Lancashire (UCLan) Cyprus, Cyprus
ABSTRACT
The proliferation of civil disobedience in recent times has prompted
questions about violence and justified resistance. Non-violence has
traditionally been associated with civil disobedience. If civil
disobedience is a political exercise, there are good normative and
pragmatic reasons for adhering to non-violence. But some violent
actions may be compatible with civil disobedience. This paper
defines violence as the application of force intending to cause or
reckless about causing harm, and seeks to distinguish violent
actions compatible with civil disobedience from conduct too
violent to qualify. Whereas civil disobedience is irreconcilable
with attacks against other human beings, some violence against
property, targeted and symbolic, coheres with the communicative
ends of civil disobedience. More intriguing questions arise when
disobedience entails extensive attacks against property, such as
activities of environmental groups against environmentally
harmful practices (ecotage). Despite the extent of violence








In November 2018, hundreds of thousands of French people took to the streets to protest
President Emmanuel Macron’s planned tax hike for diesel and gas. Although the measure
was introduced as essential for France’s transition to green energy and a vital way to
combat climate change, it was met with outrage. What began as a protest for fuel tax spir-
alled into a resounding rebuke of Macron’s presidency and a demand for social and econ-
omic justice.1 The ‘gilets jaunes’movement, named after the fluorescent vests sported by
its participants, engaged in several peaceful protests, including road blocking and
demonstrating. Yet it was the movement’s violent actions that attracted most attention.
Within weeks of the initial protest, domestic and international news outlets were brim-
ming with pictures of burning cars, police in anti-riot gear clashing with protesters
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throwing projectiles, the Arc de Triomphe vandalised, and high street shops ransacked.2
With thousands of protesters and police officers injured, thousands arrested and con-
victed, and several dead because of the protests, the ‘gilets jaunes’movement carries con-
notations of violence and havoc.3
Even more recently, the United States has witnessed a massive wave of protests against
racial inequality and police brutality. Prompted by the death of George Floyd, a black
person, at the hands of white police officers, impressive numbers of protesters have
taken to the streets.4 Although the protests were largely non-violent, there have been
instances of clashes with police and counter-protesters, as well as looting and other
damage to property. The French protest and the resurgent Black Lives Matter movement
have once again brought forward debates about violence and disobedience. Some of the
movements’ non-violent actions might easily qualify as civil disobedience. Demonstrat-
ing without a permit, or road-blocking are paradigmatic civil disobedient acts with
numerous examples throughout the last century or so. But what about more violent
behaviour? This paper does not evaluate the ‘gilets jaunes’ disobedience, nor does it
investigate the systemic problem of racism in the US, but simply examines the compat-
ibility of violent conduct with civil disobedience. I am interested in identifying actions, or
classes of action that can qualify as civil disobedience even when deemed somewhat
violent. I shall argue that although civil disobedience must be broadly non-violent,
some violent actions remain civil disobedience. One of this paper’s chief aims is to sep-
arate actions encompassing violence that remain civil disobedience from those too
violent to qualify.
This paper does not seek to ground moral justifications for violence in general. Some
forms of violent political resistance can be morally justified, perhaps even warranting
legal protections. Especially within fundamentally illegitimate regimes, violent acts
may be warranted. Killing a genocidal dictator when that saves thousands of innocent
lives is arguably morally defensible. For Hannah Arendt, violence is sometimes the
only way to ‘set the scales of justice right again’.5 Some circumstances might require
action more radical and violent than civil disobedience.6 Within sufficiently legitimate
regimes, however, the use of violence is harder to justify. In this paper, I only address
violence committed in civil disobedience. My analysis does not purport to propose cir-
cumstances under which violence in civil disobedience can be morally justified. I am
instead only concerned with the narrower question of whether (or to what extent) vio-
lence can be compatible with civil disobedience. Simply put, what kind of violent act
(if any) can still be recognised as civil disobedience. Whether violence in general is
morally justified or whether civil disobedience in general is morally justified are
beyond the scope of this paper.
2‘The Aftermath of the Gilets Jaunes Riots in Paris – in Pictures’ The Guardian (London, 2 December 2018) <https://www.
theguardian.com/world/gallery/2018/dec/02/the-aftermath-of-the-gilets-jaunes-riots-in-paris-in-pictures> accessed 27
February 2021.
3‘Lost Eyes… Hands Blown Off’ The Local Fr (29 January 2019) <https://www.thelocal.fr/20190129/france-in-numbers-
police-violence-during-yellow-vest-protests> accessed 27 February 2021.
4For a timeline of the events related to the murder of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor and others see ‘George Floyd: Why are
There Huge Protests in the US and Around the World?’ BBC (11 June 2020) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/
52813673> accessed 27 February 2021.
5Hannah Arendt, On Violence (Harcourt Publishing 1970) 64.
6E.g., Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (OUP 1979) 267.
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Civil disobedience always entails a deliberate breach of law that is committed with the
intention of communicating to a broad audience, including state authorities and the
general public, the need for some legal or political change. This definition is deliberately
broad, designed to cover a wide range of cases. It excludes various elements that are
usually associated with civil disobedience such as conscientiousness, a willingness to
be punished, and the requirement for showing fidelity to law.7 Each of these elements
raises unique concerns that I leave aside for present purposes. I shall focus
exclusively on non-violence, which has conventionally been deemed necessary for civil
disobedience.
For the purposes of this paper, I assume that civil disobedients enjoy general moral
recognition for their actions. First, the public typically sees civil disobedience as a
morally legitimate form of dissent and civic resistance. Invoking images of Martin
Luther King Jr., Rosa Parks, or Mohandas Gandhi, civil disobedience has a long tradition
and tends to trigger sympathetic responses in neutral audiences. Second, there is some
evidence that state authorities, including courts, treat civil disobedience with sympathy.8
How state authorities treat, or ought to treat, civil disobedience has sparked a debate
about the most appropriate state responses. Authors such as Ronald Dworkin and Kim-
berley Brownlee maintain that civil disobedience should generally attract no punishment
(albeit for different reasons).9 Others, such as Matthew Hall, argue that civil disobedience
should amount to a legal defence, available in court.10 David Lefkowitz proposes a third
possibility, with which I am broadly aligned, which suggests that civil disobedience
should only attract lenient or symbolic sanctions instead of harsh punishment.11 Even
though I do not engage this debate here, it seems to me that the sheer existence of ques-
tions about the appropriate treatment of civil disobedience makes my enquiry into the
type of actions that can or cannot be considered as civil disobedience because of their
violence worthwhile. Recognising some violent acts as civil disobedience is not a question
of sheer theoretical value but carries significant political and legal implications for rel-
evant actors, such as courts, lawbreakers, and the public.
This paper is divided in three parts. Section 2 sketches the conventional view that sees
violence as incompatible with civil disobedience – and some problems arising from that
position. Although dissidents have good reasons to avoid violence, some violence might
in fact buttress the protest, making it more effective and more likely to attract popular
support. To determine the scope of permissible violent action, I suggest we define vio-
lence, a task I undertake in Section 3. The definition I propose is normative, drawing
heavily from English criminal law and from actual cases of civil disobedience. This
7For conventional accounts of civil disobedience see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (2nd edn, Harvard University Press
1999) 319–23; Hugo Adam Bedau (ed), Civil Disobedience in Focus (Routledge 1991). For criticism of these models see
Kimberley Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction (OUP 2012); Robin Celikates, ‘Rethinking Civil Disobedience as a Practice
of Contestation – Beyond the Liberal Paradigm’ (2016) 23 Constellations 37.
8See for example Paul Lewis and Nidhi Prakash, ‘Ratcliffe Coal Protesters Spared Jail Sentences’ The Guardian (5 January
2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/jan/05/ratcliffe-coal-protesters-sentence>, accessed 27 Feb-
ruary 2021; Josh Gabbatiss, ‘Anti-Fracking Activists Jailed for Climbing onto Cuadrilla Lorries at Lancashire Drilling Site
Freed on Appeal’ Independent (17 October 2018) <https://www.independent.co.uk/climate-change/news/fracking-
protesters-appeal-cuadrilla-lancashire-court-jail-a8588241.html#Echobox=1539777340>, accessed 27 February 2021.
9See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Oxford Clarendon Press 1986) 114; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously
(Bloomsbury 2013) 262; Brownlee (n 7) 248.
10Matthew Hall, ‘Guilty but Civilly Disobedient: Reconciling Civil Disobedience and the Rule of Law’ (2007) 28 Cardozo Law
Review 2083.
11David Lefkowitz, ‘On a Moral Right to Civil Disobedience’ (2007) 117 Ethics 202.
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definition will, I believe, help root out instances of violent lawbreaking that fail as civil
disobedience. Last, Section 4 turns to lawbreaking encompassing violence against prop-
erty as it raises some intriguing questions.
2. Non-violence in civil disobedience
Civil disobedience, Jarret Lovell maintains, is rooted in the tradition of non-violence.12
But the role of violence within civil disobedience is by no means settled. Part of the
aim of this paper is to examine the kind of (violent) actions that qualify as civil disobe-
dience. But before investigating that enquiry, I shall first attempt to outline some of the
most common arguments put forward by advocates of non-violence in civil disobe-
dience. We can largely distinguish between two types of arguments made in favour of
non-violence in civil disobedience, namely empirical and normative. I first lay out
some empirical reasons why civil disobedients ought to refrain from violent action
and I then examine the normative arguments usually proposed against violence in
civil disobedience. Empirical arguments are contingent and do not in principle and in
all cases exclude violence from civil disobedience. They are therefore of lesser importance
when examining whether violent actions can qualify as civil disobedience. They remain
relevant, however, because they illuminate the socio-historical background against which
current debates on violence in civil disobedience are set. Empirical reasons tell us that
civil disobedients are unwise to use violence in civil disobedience; normative reasons
tell us that using violence means that one cannot engage in civil disobedience.
As explained earlier, civil disobedience is at heart a communicative enterprise. And
dissidents are generally more likely to achieve their communicative aims through non-
violence.13 For King, violence obfuscates the civil disobedients’ communicative efforts,
diverting attention from the protest’s real aims and thus inhibiting effective public
debate.14 Suffragist leader Millicent Fawcett mirrors this sentiment when she denounces
the violent actions of militant Suffragettes for alienating sympathetic Parliament
members.15
In 2015, student demonstrators campaigned in London and other parts of the UK
against the government’s plans to cut student grants. Violent clashes between police
and members of the controversial anarchist group Black Bloc, however, marred the dem-
onstrations. Student protesters were subsequently outraged with the Black Bloc activists.
‘They’re just here to fuck shit up’, a peaceful protester bemoaned.16 Their violence made
12Jarret Lovell, Crimes of Dissent (New York University Press 2009) 6.
13This is not to argue that violent action cannot attract support or contribute to a social movement’s aims. Violent groups
often arose alongside non-violent movements. For example, Malcolm X’s ‘by any means necessary’ campaign against
segregationist America was arguably instrumental for the success not only of the civil rights movement as a whole, but
of King’s non-violent protest as well.
14See e.g., Martin Luther King Jr, A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King Jr (James Washington,
Ed.) (Harper & Row Publishers 1986) 5–72. See also David Lyons, ‘Moral Judgment, Historical Reality, and Civil Disobe-
dience’ (1988) 27(1) Philosophy and Public Affairs 31, 43. For sociological evidence supporting this position see Nina
Eggert and Marco Giugni, ‘The Global Justice Movement in Switzerland’ in Donatella Della Porta (ed), The Global Justice
Movement: Cross-National and Transnational Perspectives (Paradigm Publishers 2007) 188.
15Sophie van Wingerden, The Women’s Suffrage Movement in Britain, 1866–1928 (Macmillan 1999) 100.
16Ryan Ramgobin, ‘Student Protest: Demonstrators Dispute the Actions of Black Bloc Anarchists After Violence Erupts’
Independent (5 November 2015) <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/student-protest-demonstrators-
dispute-the-actions-of-black-bloc-anarchists-after-violence-erupts-a6722036.html> accessed 27 February 2021. But
see David Mitchell, ‘Nick Clegg Getting a Good Kicking? Could Anything be More Joyous?’ The Guardian (28 November
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headlines, overshadowing the message peaceful protesters advocated. The ‘gilets
jaunes’ protest arguably follows a similar trajectory. Despite efforts for peaceful demon-
strations, some radically inclined, ‘ultra-violent’ participants tarnish the movement’s
image.17 Occasional or isolated incidents of violence have sometimes been used to discre-
dit entire movements. In 1970, four protesters against the VietnamWar set off a bomb at
university grounds after hours, accidentally killing one graduate student working late.18
Detractors and some media outlets used the tragedy to disparage and dismiss the anti-
war movement.
For Edward Glaeser and Cass Sunstein, maintaining non-violence in civil disobe-
dience carries critical tactical advantages. Protesters who adhere to non-violence invite
the state authorities’ response, which may be violent and disproportionate.19 Although
one might initially associate such responses exclusively with illegitimate and corrupt
regimes (see e.g., the Chinese response to the recent Hong Kong protest20), the tendency
to use excessive force to countenance protest bedevils even generally legitimate systems.
Harsh treatment of dissidents dramatises the confrontation between political power and
violence, and reinforces, at least in the eyes of a neutral audience, the distinction between
those who use violence as a means of maintaining an unjust structure and those who
resent violence and are eager to improve a flawed system.21 Butler observes that at
times, the state’s ‘non-reciprocated violent act’ exposes its ‘unilateral brutality’, reinfor-
cing the image of non-violent protesters as the subject of unfair treatment.22 Whereas
peaceful protesters often claim moral superiority by contrasting their non-violence
with the regime’s violence, violent protesters forego that powerful claim.23
The strategic reasons explain why actors considering civil disobedience may wish to
refrain from violent activity. But they cannot explain why violence is incompatible
with civil disobedience. For Hannah Arendt, violence is principally antithetical to poli-
tics.24 Civil disobedience, as political action, must therefore adhere to non-violence.25
The perceived incompatibility of violence and politics depends on an idealised vision
2010) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/nov/28/student-protests-tuition-fees-clegg> accessed 27
February 2021 (on violence during the 2010 student protests enhancing the protest’s visibility).
17Editorial, ‘“Gilets jaunes”: la violence ou le débat’ Le Monde (7 January 2019) <https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/
2019/01/07/gilets-jaunes-la-violence-ou-le-debat_5405930_3232.html> accessed 27 February 2021. The piece calls
on the movement to act against the ‘small ultra-violent groups’ operating within it.
18Susan Rosenfeld, ‘The Fatal Bombing That Historians Ignore’ (17 August 2001) The Chronicle of Higher Education
<https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Fatal-Bombing-That/17279> accessed 27 February 2021.
19Edward Glaeser and Cass Sunstein, ‘A Theory of Civil Disobedience’ (2015) The National Bureau of Economic Research.
See also Arendt (n 5) 54.
20James Palmer, ‘Hong Kong’s Violence Will Get Worse’ (November 2019) Foreign Policy <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/
11/11/police-killing-protests-beijing-lam-xi-hong-kong-violence-will-get-worse/> accessed 27 February 2021.
21See e.g., Arendt (n 5) 52–53.
22Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (Verso 2010) 178. See also Arendt (n 5) 52–53. For similar ideas
inspiring non-violent resistance by some American Suffragettes see Linda Ford, ‘Alice Paul and the Politics of Nonviolent
Protest’ in Jean Baker (ed), Votes for Women: The Struggle for Suffrage Revisited (OUP 2002).
23For sociological evidence supporting the effectiveness of non-violent protest see Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan,
‘Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict’ (2008) 33(1) International Security 7, 30–35.
24Arendt (n 5) 46–52. Also Annabel Herzog, ‘The Concept of Violence in the Work of Hannah Arendt’ (2017) 50 Continental
Philosophy Review 165. Cf. John Simmons, ‘Disobedience and Its Objects’ (2010) Boston University Law Review 1805,
1808. For Arendt, violence is always a means, never an end in itself. But see Judith Butler, ‘The Big Picture: Protest,
Violent and Non-violent’ Public Books (13 October 2017) <https://www.publicbooks.org/the-big-picture-protest-
violent-and-nonviolent/> accessed 27 February 2021, on violence as praxis: by acting violently, one brings about a
more violent world – violence is an end in itself.
25Also Todd May, Contemporary Political Movements and the Thought of Jacques Rancière: Equality in Action (Edinburgh
University Press 2010) 22–23.
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of politics as the realm of intelligent interaction where human action (praxis, for Arendt)
is possible. Yet others see politics in more realistic terms as embodying violence. For Max
Weber, political action is always an exercise in coercion and violence, inextricably linked
with the use of power.26
A stronger normative reason against the use of violence in civil disobedience draws on
the communicative character of the protest. Civil disobedience is a communicative effort
targeting political persuasion. Persuasion fits uneasily with the incidence of violence; the
latter is ordinarily ‘incompatible with civil disobedience as a means of address’.27 For
Steve Buckler, violence is always speechless, negating that element which makes political
interaction and persuasion possible.28 Although one cannot discount the communicative
component violent actions entail, it remains the case that civil disobedience cannot be an
act of political persuasion if it involves any violence against other people. Echoing this
conclusion, some scholars see non-violence as a precondition for political interaction.
When dissidents direct violence at others, N.P. Adams argues, they fail to treat them
as self-governing members of a political community.29 Instead, as Holloway Sparks
put it, they ‘collapse the space for collective debate’.30 Moreover, civil disobedience as
a political activity must always anticipate future cooperation; no action must undermine
that prospect.31 Violence, straining the relationship between disobedients on one hand
and state authorities and civil society on the other, jeopardises future harmonious
collaboration.
These normative reasons excluding violent conduct from the range of civilly disobe-
dient acts are forcible. And they largely corroborate the historical position that sees vio-
lence as incompatible with civil disobedience. But on closer inspection, these arguments
do not settle the question on the specific actions that are available to civil disobedients.
Violent actions can be distinguished between those directed against human beings and
those directed at property (even if, as I argue later, that distinction comes with its own
limitations). The normative reasons against the use of violence in civil disobedience
are in fact reasons against the use of violence against other persons in civil disobedience.
Violence against human beings is always and in principle incompatible with persuasive
action and as such can never qualify as civil disobedience. By attacking others, one is
shutting them out of political deliberation and discussion. As such, no attacks on
human beings can qualify as civil disobedience. Some attacks against property,
however, appear to remain compatible with the communicative ends of civil
disobedience.
Against a principled exclusion of violent action from civil disobedience, Kimberley
Brownlee suggests that even violent actions can in fact sometimes qualify as civil disobe-
dience. More specifically, some violence is compatible with civil disobedience because it
26Max Weber, Political Writings (Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs, Ronald eds) (CUP 1994), 309–69, esp.310–11.
27Rawls (n 7) 321. See also Peter Singer, Democracy and Disobedience (Clarendon Press 1973) 86.
28Steve Buckler, Hannah Arendt and Political Theory (Edinburgh University Press 2011) 108. Also Margaret Canovan,
Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of her Political Thought (CUP 1994) 209.
29NP Adams, ‘Uncivil Disobedience: Political Commitment and Violence’ (2017) Res Publica 1, 11; Tony Milligan, Civil Dis-
obedience: Protest, Justification, and the Law (Bloomsbury Publishing 2013) 123.
30Holloway Sparks, ‘Dissident Citizenship: Democratic Theory, Political Courage, and Activist Women’ (1997) 12(4) Hypatia
74, 84.
31Andrew Sabl, ‘Looking Forward to Justice: Rawlsian Civil Disobedience and Its Non-Rawlsian Lessons’ (2001) 9(3) Journal
of Political Philosophy 307, 309–14.
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can be used to enhance the protest’s communicativeness.32 Dissidents resorting to vio-
lence may amplify their intended message and successfully grab the attention of a
large audience, by either stressing the urgency of the protested situation or testifying
to the protesters’ sincerity.33 Some violent conduct may carry strong symbolic messages
that embody civil disobedience. Brownlee’s refusal of a blanket rejection of all violence is
persuasive, as such rejection unduly excludes conduct that bolsters the protest’s political
ends.34 Rejecting the idea that violence is incompatible with political persuasion, Brown-
lee maintains that there are no good normative reasons to rule out violent conduct as civil
disobedience.
At the root of the disagreement between those holding non-violence as a necessary
condition for civil disobedience and those rejecting that requirement lies, I argue, a
failure to speak on the same terms. Brownlee is surely right that some violence
(namely against property) is compatible with political persuasion. Similarly, it is by no
means clear that targeted attacks on property undermine collective debate or definitively
lack a persuasive character. And even if we can plausibly distinguish between violence
against human beings, which can never amount to civil disobedience, and violence
against property, which may be compatible with civil disobedience, there are deeper
questions remaining. When is an act directed at another human being violent? And
when is it a matter of mere inconvenience, falling short of violence, and thus capable
of being civil disobedience? To resolve this conundrum, I argue that we must identify
what violence entails. A concrete definition of violence becomes vital for potential dissi-
dents, officials of the legal system, and audiences at large. Surprisingly, theorists of civil
disobedience have largely neglected clarifying the adopted definition of violence. Some
theorists correctly diagnose the lack of definition as the core obstacle in accepting or
rejecting non-violence in civil disobedience, but have not proposed a definition to
resolve the tension.35 Determining a definition of violence becomes vital to distinguish
between violent and non-violent acts, which is, in turn, an important step towards iden-
tifying actions that are compatible with civil disobedience.
3. Defining violence
Academic disciplines from sociology to psychology adopt competing definitions of vio-
lence, conceptualising violence either broadly or narrowly.36 Broad conceptions of vio-
lence identify as violent conduct that violates rights to bodily and psychic integrity
and autonomy. For Vittorio Bufacchi, broad conceptions stress the close link between
violence and the violation of individual rights.37 The obvious defect of this approach is
that depending on what one considers a right one would detect violence in a large
class of cases. Strictly speaking, on an entirely open-ended notion of rights, almost all
32Brownlee (n 7) 23.
33See e.g., Milligan (n 29) 153.
34Brownlee (n 7) 44, 221. See also Celikates (n 7) 41–42.
35Celikates (n 7) 41.
36Willem de Haan, ‘Violence as an Essentially Contested Concept’ in Sophie Body-Gentrot and Pieter Spierenburg (eds),
Violence in Europe: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Springer 2008); Zygmund Bauman, ‘Violence, Postmodern’
in Zygmund Bauman (ed) Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality (Blackwell 1995) 139.
37Vittorio Bufacchi, ‘Two Concepts of Violence’ (2005) 3 Political Studies 193, 196–97. See also Stuart Henry, ‘What is
School Violence? An Integrated Definition’ (2000) Annals of the American Acasemy of Political and Social Science 2–3.
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conduct, in one way or another, can be construed as violating another’s rights making
violence inevitable and ubiquitous, and therefore meaningless.38 Distress and anxiety
become relevant markers to identify intrusions. Were broad definitions to be adopted
anything one might deem disagreeable, and thus a source of distress or anxiety, would
become violent.39
Robin Celikates, lampooning the German court’s decision in the so called Laepple
case40 to recognise violence against the driver of a vehicle forced to stop when encoun-
tering a sit-down road blocking, ultimately rejects broad conceptions of violence as ill-
suited for civil disobedience.41 Laepple surely raises unique difficulties because the
German word ‘Gewalt’ translates to violence, force, or power.42 But the court’s decision
epitomises what Habermas fears are attempts to ‘extend the juridical concept of violence
… to include unconventional means of influencing the formation of political will’.43
Once emblematic of civil disobedience, peaceful sit-ins become violent on a broad con-
ception insofar as they obstruct other agents’ right to free movement. Such outcomes
regrettably distort public perceptions of what actions actually amount to civil
disobedience.
Narrow conceptions, by contrast, understand violence in terms of the use of physical
force to cause harm. Such conceptions are more suitable for discussions about civil dis-
obedience. Political history indicates that questions of violence in protest are overwhel-
mingly questions of human beings exercising force over others or against property. The
definition developed in this paper is not meant to universally apply to all discussions on
violence.44 There will always be disagreement about the concept’s scope, components,
and use.45 The proposed definition resembles an attempt to resolve the question of vio-
lence in civil disobedience.
Because civil disobedience always involves lawbreaking, questions of violence in
protest emerge intertwined with questions of legality and criminalisation. To define vio-
lence, I therefore begin from examining how law, and in particular English criminal law,
understands violence. To clarify, turning to criminal law (and English criminal law in
particular) is merely one way to explore the concept of violence. One could choose to
define violence in different ways, as indeed several theorists have done.46 My turn to
criminal law is motivated by the fact that criminal law is closely associated with the
idea of violence. In addition, as I shall show, criminal law points us, to some extent, to
a normatively critical distinction between violence directed against human beings and
violence directed against property. This distinction becomes salient to determine the
type of violence that is compatible with civil disobedience.
38Bufacchi (n 37) 197. See also Joseph Betz, ‘Violence: Garver’s Definition and a Deweyean Correction’ (1977) 87(4) Ethics
339, 341.
39PAJ Waddington, Dough Badger, and Ray Bull, ‘Appraising the Inclusive Definition of Workplace “Violence”’ (2005) 45
British Journal of Criminology 141, 158.
40(1969) 23 BGHSt 46. See also Peter Quint, Civil Disobedience and the German Courts: The Pershing Missile Protests in Com-
parative Perspective (Routledge 2008).
41Celikates (n 7) 41. See also John Morreal, ‘The Justifiability of Violent Civil Disobedience’ in HA Bedau (ed), Civil Disobe-
dience in Focus (Routledge 1991).
42The court found that blocking the road was sufficient force for the purposes of Article 240 of the Penal Code.
43Jürgen Habermas, ‘Civil Disobedience: Litmus Test for the Democratic Constitutional State’ (1985) 30 Berkeley Journal of
Sociology 95, 96.
44de Haan (n 36) 30.
45ibid.
46See e.g., (n 36).
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A chief, or for some the sole, aim of criminal law is harm-prevention.47 Harm may
result from acts deemed violent broadly or narrowly defined; both conceptions
become relevant. Laws therefore forbid actions ranging from violations of rights to
attacks on other human beings. What specific actions law ought to criminalise is a per-
ennial question in legal theory. I however focus my analysis on specific legal instruments
that explicitly discuss violent crime. These legal sources prove particularly helpful in deli-
neating what violence entails.
One might object that law is an inappropriate starting point for this investigation.
Criminal law considers various arguments in proscribing conduct, including consider-
ations of fundamental rights, issues of public health and safety, scarcity of resources
and appropriate criminal policy, and so forth. Whether an act is violent is merely one
such consideration. This objection rightly suggests that choices to criminalise are irredu-
cible to evaluations about violence. But law’s treatment of violence remains instructive. A
violent act is amalum in se: its violence is in itself a reason for its prohibition.48 If we seek
to determine what makes an act violent, beginning from conduct criminalised because of
its violence is an ideal starting point. Moreover, in some respects, and given how law in a
democracy shapes and is shaped by public attitudes, perceptions, and societal ideals, what
the law identifies as violent will largely coincide with what a society as a whole would
recognise as violent. There is great interconnectedness between criminal law and a
society’s dominant beliefs and convictions.49 Asserting an intrinsic connection
between criminal law and violence, Alice Ristroph remarks that ‘fear of crime, to a sub-
stantial degree, is fear of violence’.50
Before investigating law’s treatment of violent crime, let me first distinguish between
violence and harm. The two terms are often closely associated. But harm might also orig-
inate from non-violent acts. Joseph Raz’s discussion against non-violence as a necessary
element of civil disobedience provides a pertinent example: a strike by ambulance drivers
is by no means violent, but may produce serious harm.51 Conversely, violent acts may
result in no actual harm; throwing a punch against an unsuspecting person but
missing remains violent. Determining the violence of an act requires, as Lord Justice
Buxton in ex parte August put it, that we ‘look at the nature, and not at the results, of
the unlawful conduct’.52 When laws prohibit violent acts, they do so because they recog-
nise the wrongness of violence. Even if no harm actually materialises, violent actions are a
wrong appropriately targeted by criminal law.
To delimit appropriate conduct in civil disobedience, Raz prefers harm as a more apt
benchmark. Brownlee also explicitly stresses the ‘more salient issue of harm’.53 Yet that
choice hardly dispels the problems. To substitute violence with harm is to replace one
47John Stuart Mill’s harm principle forms the backbone of English criminal law: JS Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (John
Gray ed) (OUP 2008) 14–15. See HLA Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (OUP 1963) 4–6; Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Prin-
ciples of Criminal Law (OUP 2016), 59–99; Viktor Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes (OUP 2016) 11, 159–63.
48See generally Antony Duff, ‘Principle and Contradiction in the Criminal Law: Motives and Criminal Liability’ in Antony
Duff (ed), Philosophy and the Criminal Law: Principles and Critique (CUP 1998) 183.
49See e.g., Roger Cotterrell, Emile Durkheim: Law in a Moral Domain (Stanford University Press 1999) Ch.7 (on French soci-
ologist Emile Durkheim’s views on that close relationship).
50Alice Ristroph, ‘Law in the Shadow of Violence’ (2011) Alabama Law Review 62(3), 572.
51Raz (n 6) 267. See also Guy Aitchison, ‘Coercion, Resistance and the Radical Side of Non-violent Action’ (2018) 69(1)
Raisons Politiques 48.
52R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel (ex parte August), [2000] EWCA Civ 331, 24.
53Brownlee (n 7) 23.
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contested term with another, equally ambiguous.54 It remains unclear what constitutes
harm; much like violence, harm can be construed broadly or narrowly.55 Moreover,
Raz’s and Brownlee’s preference for harm leads to undesirable conclusions. To exclude
actions occasioning harm from civil disobedience is unrepresentative of conduct conven-
tionally identified with civil disobedience. Sit-ins and road-blocking are emblematic of
civil disobedience even if they result in some harm (whether they occasion harm ulti-
mately depends, of course, on how broadly one understands harm).
3.1. English law and violent crime
Violence, I argue, can be located in the use of force that intends to cause, or is reckless
about causing harm. Although no actual harm needs to occur, violence is closely linked
with risks of harm. This conception of violence coheres with the way English criminal law
treats violence. And it also supports an analysis of civil disobedience that faithfully
describes historical practice.
The Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 (OAPA) identifies several offences we
would readily associate with violence. But it does not discuss general conceptions of vio-
lence, nor does it explicitly refer to violent crime. On the other hand, the Crown Prose-
cution Service (CPS) provides a list of violent crimes. It includes offences such as murder,
assault, robbery, acid attacks, and knife and gun attacks.56 The list is indicative rather
than exhaustive given that it excludes offences typically involving injury to others,
such as sexual assault, which is listed under sexual offences.57 Although the CPS guide-
lines are not legally binding, they remain important insofar as they identify conduct
broadly matching public perceptions of violence.58
Listing violent offences seems inadequate to put the question of non-violence in civil
disobedience to rest. Consider assault, one of the catalogued violent offences. It is easy to
detect violence in knife attacks or murder but assault, the less severe of the offences gen-
erally associated with conduct against persons, represents a greyer area. Common assault
comprises both behaviour that intentionally or recklessly causes a victim to apprehend
the immediate and unlawful use of force, and battery, which involves the intentional
or reckless application of unlawful force.59 Contrary to the CPS classification, I maintain
that battery may in fact be non-violent. If violence is not always present in cases of
battery, then actions adequate to ground battery in law might be non-violent and there-
fore permissible for civil disobedience.
Any unwanted touching or unlawful application of force suffices to establish the
conduct element of battery.60 Any unconsented to contact, even entailing innocuous
54E.g., William Scheuerman, ‘Recent Theories of Civil Disobedience: An Anti-Legal Turn’ (2015) 23(4) Journal of Political
Philosophy 427, 440
55E.g., Eric Heinze, ‘Victimless Crimes’ (1998) 4 Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics.
56Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Violent Crime’ (2018) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/violent-crime> accessed 27 February 2021.
57On rape and violence see Ristroph (n 50) 593–98. Cf. John Gardner, ‘Rationality and the Rule of Law in Offences Against
the Person’ (1994) 53(3) The Cambridge Law Journal 502, 511.
58A similar list appears in the Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW), Section 6 <https://www.ons.gov.uk/
peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/yearendingjune2018> accessed
27 February 2021.
59E.g., R v Venna [1975] 3 All ER 788. Courts find intention when an outcome is a virtual certainty of one’s actions (e.g., R v
Woollin [1999] AC 82 HL). Recklessness has a more complicated judicial history, yet it is taken to entail the conscious
taking of an unjustified risk (or ‘advertent recklessness’ in Horder (n 47) 196. See R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396).
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force, ordinarily suffices for battery.61 Identifying violence with the application of
unwanted force captures cases of battery plainly violent, such as hitting someone
without a lawful excuse. But the offence might also occur by removing another
person’s shoes,62 or touching their clothes.63 The force exerted here is trivial and risks
no injury. What these cases indicate is that battery is deemed inappropriate and crimi-
nalised chiefly as a violation of one’s integrity and autonomy.64 What is significant for
battery is the violation resulting from one’s actions even if no injury is occasioned,
intended, foreseen, or even possible at all.
The English courts’ approach to consent in cases of battery and in offences causing
actual or grievous bodily injury embodies the theoretical dissonance between battery
and other violent offences. Absence of consent is an ingredient for battery; only uncon-
sented to touching qualifies for the offence. By contrast, and following R v. Brown,
consent is not a defence for offences occasioning actual or grievous bodily harm.65
There is some correlation between the court’s reluctance to allow consent as a defence
where injury is the intended outcome of one’s conduct and the permissibility of the
defence in cases of battery. Consent makes sense as a defence for offences that criminalise
violations of integrity and autonomy because consenting is itself an exercise in auton-
omy. But the law hesitates to allow consent to the incidence of violence because violence
is a malum in se, something inherently harmful to the society. Absent a public interest
reason, violence cannot be tolerated.66
Another source of law is also illuminating. The Criminal Injuries Compensation
Scheme 2012 (the Scheme) was established under s.11 (1) of the Criminal Injuries Com-
pensation Act 1995. The Scheme’s aim is to provide compensation for victims of violent
crimes. It reveals unique public feelings of sympathy for victims of violence.67 Violence is
central for the purposes of the Scheme.68 Insofar as the Scheme embodies public percep-
tions of condemnation of violent conduct, it offers significant insight into civil disobe-
dience. We should bear in mind that since the Scheme is publicly funded there are
significant cost calculations weighing on its operation. It is unsurprising that the
Scheme adopts a strict approach to what qualifies as violent crime.69
The Consultation paper published by the Ministry of Justice attempts to clarify how
violent crimes distinguish from non-violent crimes. The Scheme recognises as violent
those crimes that contain ‘a physical attack’ or any other ‘act or omission of a violent
nature which causes physical injury to a person’.70 The sheer use of force is however
inadequate to establish violence – the Scheme requires a further mental element. Acts
or omissions must occur either intentionally or recklessly for the conduct to qualify as
60See e.g., Collins v Willcock [1984] 3 All ER 374.
61Some interactions, such as patting someone’s back to attract their attention, are generally acceptable parts of ordinary
life and therefore insufficient to establish the offence. See Collins v Wilcock [1984]; Coward v Baddeley 4 H&N 478 (1859).
62R. v George, Crim. L.R. 52 [1956].
63R v Thomas, 81 Cr App R 331 (1985).
64William Wilson, Criminal Law (5th edn, Pearson 2014) 304. See also Collins v Willcock [1984] at 1177.
65R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212.
66See e.g., sporting events such as boxing. Attorney-General’s Reference (No.6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715, 719.
67Ministry of Justice, The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012 (London 2012) para 1. See also Ristroph (n 50) 612–
13 (on violence as the cause of public outrage).
68Ministry of Justice (n 67) para 60. David Miers, ‘Compensating Deserving Victims of Violent Crime: The Criminal Injuries
Compensation Scheme 2012’ (2014) 34(2) Legal Studies 249–53.
69Miers (n 68) 245–48. See also Ristroph (n 50) 603.
70Ministry of Justice (n 67), Annex B 2(1).
JURISPRUDENCE 11
violent.71 Violence, it becomes clear, always involves the intention to endanger life or
recklessness as to whether life would be endangered. The state of mind of the actor is
important to determine an act’s violence. Investigating the correct approach to identify-
ing violent crimes for the purposes of the Scheme, courts have determined that violent
crime is not a ‘term of art’ with a ready definition but remains, in the end, a ‘jury ques-
tion’.72 Predetermined lists enumerating offences do not pre-empt the need for ad hoc
investigation.
Absent the appropriate mental element, application of force cannot qualify as violent.
Hurling stuffed animals to police officers in protest, a tactic that attracted considerable
media attention during the April 2001 anti-globalisation demonstrations in Quebec,73
might constitute the application of unwanted force, and thus battery, but lacks the inten-
tion to cause injury. It is a symbolic act emphatically dramatising a particular political
message. The choice of stuffed animals perfectly encapsulates the dissidents’ desire to
exert only trivial and harmless force incapable of causing physical injury. Similarly, in
2015, Chilean students and professors demonstrated without permission against the gov-
ernment’s education policies.74 Having written policy proposals on footballs, they pro-
ceeded to lob them towards police forces who tried to repel their march, without
risking any harm.
There is salient difference between throwing rocks at police and hurling stuffed
animals or lobbing footballs at them.75 Both actions qualify as battery yet only the
former involves real endangerment of life and limb. Throwing stuffed animals or game
balls remains non-violent and thus falls squarely within the civil disobedience repertoire.
Brownlee, working from a broad and vague definition of violence that includes any
intended or unintended, major or minor action causing injury to others, and any
action risking injury to others,76 is forced to classify throwing stuffed animal at police
officers as violent.77 It is partly for this that she goes on to reject non-violence as a necess-
ary requirement for civil disobedience.
To be sure, ordinarily non-violent acts such as road-blocking may become violent and
thus fail as civil disobedience if they encompass the relevant mental condition. Blocking
the road in front of a hospital’s emergency wing, or deliberately obstructing the path of
ambulances, would, in all likelihood, and assuming the absence of mitigating conditions
(e.g., the emergency department is not in operation at the moment, or the blockage only
lasts a few moments), create serious risks of injury to human beings. When those
actions intend to cause or are reckless about causing injury to others, they cannot be
civil disobedience. Maintaining the proviso of non-violence is to expect civil disobedients
71ibid Annex B 2(2).
72R v CICB (ex parte Webb) [1987] 1 QB 74, 77G (Lawton LJ); ATH Smith, ‘The Public Order Act 1986, Part 1: The New
offences’ (1987) Criminal Law Review 156, 159.
73See e.g., Benjamin Shepard, Play, Creativity, and Social Movements: If I Can’t Dance, It’s Not My Revolution (Routledge
2011) 242.
74El Heraldo, ‘Estudiantes y profesores en Chile lanzan pelotas como forma de protesta a pocas horas de la Copa América’
(15 June 2015) <https://www.elheraldo.co/deportes/estudiantes-y-profesores-en-chile-lanzan-pelotas-como-forma-de-
protesta-pocas-horas-de-la> Accessed 27 February 2021.
75Rock throwing resulting in injury could also be prosecuted under s.47 OAPA (assault occasioning actual bodily harm).
See Gardner (n 57) 505.
76Brownlee (n 7) 21.
77ibid 21–22.
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to refrain from conduct intending to cause or reckless about causing harm to other
human beings.
Violence, I have suggested, occurs when acts intentionally or recklessly risk harm,
even if no harm actually results. This excludes negligence as a sufficient mental
element. Agents behave negligently when they act in ways that fall below an objective
standard of conduct that an ordinary person would maintain.78 Negligence therefore
lacks the maliciousness associated with the intended or reckless infliction of harm and
as such must not be associated with violence.79
What kind of harm must an act target for it to be considered violent? Physical inju-
ries surely qualify although, as the court held in R v Donovan in determining what
counts as actual bodily harm, the injury must at least not be ‘merely transient or
trifling’.80 Psychological harm, however, raises different concerns. Sometimes psycho-
logical injury is more damaging than physical.81 True as this may be, it is difficult to
recognise de minimis psychological harm, such as sheer distress or temporary anxiety,
as sufficient.82 In Chan Fook, distress and panic were deemed ‘mere emotions’.83 The
law generally maintains that sufficient psychological harm must amount to a recog-
nised psychiatric injury.84 For Jeremy Horder, reluctance to allow for minor mental
injuries such as distress is understandable. Had de minimis psychological injury
qualified, criminal law would be used to criminalise immorality per se.85 The same
applies to lawbreaking in civil disobedience. Sheer distress, anxiety, or inconvenience,
cannot qualify as sufficient harm to dub an action violent, and thus disqualify it from
civil disobedience. Actions of civil disobedience remain non-violent even when they
intend to shock or cause distress.
Nor does the use of violence in self-defence frustrate civil disobedience.86 In response
to the authorities’ unnecessary use of tear-gas to dismantle a sit-in, for example, knocking
the hosepipe from the police officer’s hands would be morally and legally justified. Self-
defence is an appropriate legal defence. Acts of self-defence must, however, be restrained;
they cannot threaten or be perceived as threatening more extensive physical injury.
When dissidents counter violence with violence beyond the narrow limits of self-
defence they jeopardise their status as civil disobedients.
In this section, I have developed a narrow definition of violence appropriate for civil
disobedience. Agents act violently when they apply force that intentionally or recklessly
risks harm. Violence encompasses a conduct and a mental element. There must be some
force applied, directly or indirectly. In cases of civil disobedience, this requirement will be
easily determined. But violence also requires that the use of force is intended to cause, or
is reckless about causing, actual and not merely trivial physical harm or serious
78See e.g., William Wilson, Criminal Law (6th edn, Pearson 2017) 151–52.
79ibid 140–41.
80[1934] 2 K.B. 498, 509.
81Morreal (n 41) 37; Piero Moraro, ‘Violent Civil Disobedience and Willingness to Accept Punishment’ (2007) 8(2) Essays in
Philosophy.
82Taylorson v Shieldness Produce Ltd [1994] PIQR P329; McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410; Page v Smith [1996] AC 155;
Ministry of Justice (n 67) Annex E, part A.
83[1994] 1 WLR 689.
84Ireland and Burstow [1998] AC 147, 230–33 (on the need of expert evidence).
85Jeremy Horder, ‘Rethinking Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person’ (1994) 14(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 335,
350. Also Ristroph (n 50) 573–76.
86See e.g., Milligan (n 29) 14.
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psychiatric injury. Civil disobedients defending their actions’ non-violence ought to
show that their behaviour did not create obvious and foreseeable risks of injury.
Narrow as the definition might seem, it is broad enough to allow for force directed
against property to qualify as violence. And it is to attacks against property that I now
turn, for they raise intriguing questions about civil disobedience.
4. Violence against property
Expecting civil disobedients to refrain from violence against human beings is largely
uncontroversial. But the definition of violence I have proposed leaves open the possibility
that the application of force harms property, as well as human beings. And even though
the legal approaches to violence discussed so far are agent-centric, other parts of law
adopt definitions of violence incorporating attacks against property. For example, the
Public Order Act 1986, which introduces offences encompassing a violent component,
recognises as violent ‘conduct towards property as well as… towards persons’.87 If vio-
lence also entails property damage, then offences under the Criminal Damage Act 1971,
which captures activities damaging property, become inappropriate for civil
disobedience.
Theorists of civil disobedience have conventionally held the proviso of non-violence to
extend to property.88 In support of this thesis, one might highlight the hazy distinction
between damage to property and personal injury. First, some damage to property is inse-
parable from serious physical or psychological harm. Destroying one’s shelter plausibly
results in great physical injury. In addition, human beings are often attached to their
property.89 For example, damaging one’s family heirlooms may result in serious psycho-
logical harm. Second, given howWestern societies in particular value private property, its
protection is a chief aim of legal systems. Private property is often deemed an extension
of one’s self, with attacks against it carrying significant weight. This also assumes a core
distinction between private and public property to which I return later. Whereas attacks
on private property are particularly objectionable, those against public property are more
defensible.
To clarify, whether an attack on property amounts to violence for the purposes of civil
disobedience is a question separate from the issue of the moral justifiability of the
(violent) act. I do not address that second question. And indeed, whether we consider
an attack on property morally justified will ultimately depend on the moral or political
philosophy one would use to analyse the incident. This section investigates attacks on
property that are in fact compatible with civil disobedience. Agents undertaking those
acts remain within the ambit of civil disobedience and will ultimately be able to enjoy
whatever protections, legal or political, a community might afford them.90
I resist a principled exclusion of all attacks on property. To begin, law constructs crim-
inal damage of property broadly. Courts have held that even temporary impairment or
damage that can easily be repaired might satisfy the requirements for criminal
damage.91 In Hardman, protesters affiliated with the group ‘Campaign for Nuclear
87S.8, Public Order Act 1986. See also Antonelli v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1998] Q.B. 948, 961.
88HA Bedau, On Civil Disobedience (1961) 58 Journal of Philosophy 653, 656.
89Mary Jackman, Violence in Social Life (2002) Annual Review of Sociology 387, 395.
90See (n 9–11).
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Disarmament’ used soluble paint to draw figures on the pavement representing the
victims of the Hiroshima bombings.92 The paint would wash away naturally within
days. The court nevertheless maintained that such graffiti still constituted criminal
damage because the authorities incurred the cost of cleaning it. Requiring civil disobedi-
ents to maintain non-violence by refraining entirely from property damage is therefore
too demanding because it disqualifies actions that are particularly effective in represent-
ing political messages and bolstering the protest’s communicativeness.
ForHabermas, some targeteddestructionof propertymight serve the symbolic character
of civil disobedience.93 It would be inappropriate to exclude from civil disobedience actions
clearly embodying the communicative component of the protest, such as taggingwalls with
political messages. In Illinois in 1981, a group of women formed the Grassroots Group of
Second Class Citizens to support the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the US consti-
tution that would provide protections for all citizens regardless of sex.94 Members of the
movement performed a series of civil disobedient acts, including chaining themselves to
the Illinois Governor’s office door, occupying legislative areas, and disrupting discussions
in the local legislature.95 No action attracted more attention, however, than the decision to
write in pig’s blood the names of theGovernor and anti-ERA legislators on themarble floor
outside the legislative chamber on the day the local Senate voted down the amendment.
Blood, Mary Lee Sargent explains, ‘was [used] to symbolise the death of the ERA and the
bloodofwomenwho sufferwithout legal equality’.96Distasteful or offensive as that defacing
might have appeared to some, it served the symbolic aims of the protest. The provocative
aspect of such property damage ensured that the dissidents’ message was widely spread.
It would be a mistake to exclude that action from civil disobedience.
Some thinkers insist that property damage raises no concerns for civil disobedience.
Consider Black Bloc activists, who support an anarchist, anti-capitalist agenda and typi-
cally attack private or public property they associate with global injustices (e.g., banks or
large corporations).97 As Richard Glover explains, these activists regard their actions as
non-violent by reconceptualising violence to exclude property damage.98 Since property
is inanimate, they argue, it feels no pain and cannot be injured.
Behind the Black Bloc’s claim to non-violence lies a fundamental belief in the essential
moral difference between committing violence against property and against people.99 For
Adams, again, violence against persons is invariably incompatible with the political ends
91See e.g., Roe v Kingerlee [1986] Crim LR 735.
92Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset [1986] Crim LR 330. See also Michael Watson, ‘Graffit: Popular Art, Anti-
social Behaviour or Criminal Damage?’ (2004) 35 Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 1.
93Habermas (n 43) 99.
94See e.g., Brigance, ‘Equal Rights Amendment’ in I Ness (ed), Encyclopedia of American Social Movements: Volume One-
Four (Rouledge 2015) 373–77.
95See e.g., Mary Lee Sargent, ‘Women Rising in Resistance: A Direct Action Network’ (1989) Women’s Studies International
Forum 12(1).
96ibid 114.
97For Francis Dupuis-Déri, the Black Blocs are ‘ad hoc assemblages of individuals or affinity groups that last for the dur-
ation of a march or rally…more often than not they are content to march peacefully’ (Who’s Afraid of the Black Blocs:
Anarchy in Action Around the World (PM Press 2014) 2). See also ibid 83–95 (on targeting private property).
98Richard Glover, ‘“When We Smash Window…” Black Blocs amd Breaches of the Peace’ [2018] Criminal Law Review 830,
842. See, in general, Jose Pedro Zúquete, ‘World War A: Contemporary Anarchists and Extreme Left Perpetrators’ in
Michael Fredholm (ed), Understanding Lone Actor Terrorism: Past Experience, Future Outlook, and Response Strategies
(Routledge 2016) 49–52.
99See e.g., Milligan (n 29) 15; Howard Zinn, Disobedience and Democracy: Nine Fallacies on Law and Order (Random House
1968) 110. The distinction is latent in Habermas (n 43) 100.
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of civil disobedience because it removes the objects of violence ‘from the class of people
that we are committed to living together with’.100 But because property is not ‘a potential
member of the political project’ nothing restricts civil disobedients from targeting it.101
Similarly, for Morreall, objectionable acts of violent civil disobedience are only those that
somehow ‘get at’ some human beings.102 Breach of the peace jurisprudence reflects the
greater moral weight of attacks on property when linked with possibility of injury to
human beings.103 Violence against property only qualifies as breach of the peace if the
property’s owner is present.104
Both Adams and Morreal correctly observe that when property damage gets at some
human beings, endangering their physical integrity, it becomes objectionable. It is one
thing to sabotage a factory in the middle of the night when no workers are on site and
another to cause similar damage while jeopardising lives. Dissidents who, as in the
first scenario, take steps to ensure that their actions do not endanger others (or their live-
lihoods) have a stronger claim to civil disobedience, even if their actions are violence
against property. But both theorists are mistaken to contend that only property
damage getting at others fails as civil disobedience. The presumption of compatibility
rebutted when property damage harms others is incorrect for it permits extensive and
indiscriminate violence against property to qualify as civil disobedience. But extensive
violence often frustrates the communicative ends of civil disobedience. Instead of a pre-
sumption of compatibility of property damage to civil disobedience, I suggest that the
inverse obtains. Violence against property (beyond the purely symbolic, trivial damage
of property) is prima facie incompatible with civil disobedience, unless certain conditions
obtain. Property damage will cohere with civil disobedience when attacks on property (a)
safeguard the bodily and psychic integrity of other agents, avoiding acting in ways that
intend to cause or are reckless about causing injury to other people and (b) embody pol-
itical communication. Call these the safeguarding and the communication tests. Unless
both conditions are satisfied, property damage cannot be civil disobedience. When prop-
erty damage fails either of these two conditions, it moves beyond the limits of civil dis-
obedience. Again, failure to fulfil these tests does not necessarily mean that the act is not
morally justified. But it does mean that the act is not morally justified as civil
disobedience.
The safeguarding test sets a strict condition on the kind of conduct compatible with
civil disobedience. Whenever attacks against property intentionally or recklessly create
risks of harm to other human beings, they fail as civil disobedience. The communication
test needs further clarification. Property damage must communicate the desire to change
some law or policy. The presumption against property damage also means that when the
same political message with a similar anticipated effect can be delivered without property
damage, that option ought to be preferred. As Raz remarks, non-violent disobedience is
100Adams (n 29) 12. See also Moraro (n 81) (on a defence of violence against property and rejection of violence against
others based on Kant’s Formula of Humanity).
101Adams (n 29) 13–14. Exceptions arise when property damage imperils one’s political membership, e.g., targeting their
shelter.
102Morreal (n 41) 38.
103S.40 (4) of the Public Order Act, 1986 is not a criminal, but a common law offence in the UK (with the exception of
Scotland). See also R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (ex parte Clawes) [1977] 1 WLR 1353 (violence against prop-
erty cannot qualify for compensation under the Scheme).
104See Glover (n 98) 831. Also Howell [1982] 1 QB 416.
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preferable to violent civil disobedience when it achieves the same outcome: no direct
harm flowing from violence occurs, no further violence is incited, and the threat of vio-
lence antagonising potential allies and entrenching opponents’ hostility is avoided.105
This preference to non-violent action is irreducible to a requirement incumbent on law-
breakers to show that their actions are a matter of last resort. Protesters are not expected
to demonstrate that all other non-violent options are unavailable or have been exhausted.
Indeed, even if other options remain open, violent action might be preferred as an excep-
tional way to, say, portray the exigency of one’s dissent.
The line between symbolic and acceptable violence to property on the one hand and
destruction for the sake of destruction on the other is admittedly blurry. In practice, the
more extensive the property destruction the more unlikely it be perceived as civil disobe-
dience. Other factors contribute to this assessment. The publicness of the dissenters’
conduct (their willingness to reveal their identities and explain clearly their reasons for
action, perhaps assuming responsibility), also influences public perceptions. Moreover,
the dissidents’ other actions, such as their interaction with authorities become salient.
Protesters damaging property who then proceed to clash with the police likely forego
their claims to civil disobedience. With these limits in mind, I proceed to analyse
ecotage, a controversial form of protest involving significant property damage that has
nevertheless attained increased popularity over the last few decades.
4.1. Ecotage
Ecotage illustrates the complex issues associated with the commission of extensive, in terms
of cost, damage to property in the course of civil disobedience. Ecoteurs illegally sabotage
property or machinery used in activities that further environmental catastrophe, typically
aiming to balloon thefinancial cost associatedwith ecologically destructive conduct.106 Eco-
tage’s purpose, Tony Milligan explains, ‘is not supplication, public petitioning or oneness
with the earth, but the immediate prevention of harm… . a way to get [the enemy] to
cease anddesist’.107 For present purposes, I distinguish ecotage fromother forms of environ-
mental activism such as Greenpeace-organised non-violent protest. That might involve
road-blocking in protest of inadequate environmental policies or symbolic property
damage such as spray paintingmessages on coal factories.108 These easily qualify as civil dis-
obedience. I also ignore legal ecotage, which entails gaining injunctions to postpone,
obstruct, or entirely shut down some action, usually by making it more expensive.109 To
be sure, these distinctions are rarely clear-cut, particularly given activists’ tendency to
employmixed tactics. I focus solelyonwhether substantially andunlawfullydamagingprop-
erty with the primary aim of harm prevention qualifies as civil disobedience.110 Scholars
have traditionally labelled disobedience primarily aiming at harm prevention direct
105Raz (n 6) 267.
106I use a very narrow definition of ecotage that excludes activities involving activists physically blocking some conduct
without property damage or violence, e.g., chaining themselves to trees to prevent logging. I also exclude legal
ecotage, which entails using legal mechanisms such as gaining injunctions to postpone, obstruct, or entirely shut
down some action, to make it more expensive. For a broader account, see Michael Martin, ‘Ecosabotage and Civil Dis-
obedience’ (1990) 14(2) Environmental Ethics 291, 292.
107Milligan (n 29) 26.
108Steve Vanderheiden, ‘Eco-Terrorism or Justified Resistance? Radical Environmentalism and the “War on Terror”’ (2005)
33(3) Politics & Society 425, 433.
109See Martin (n 106) 292.
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action, to be distinguished from civil disobedience by the former’s lack of a communicative
component.111 But instances of direct action can qualify as civil disobedience even if not pri-
marily targeting communication when the action entails a communicative component.
Damaging equipment harmful to the environment often leads to the damage of private
property. For Raz, this alone disqualifies lawbreaking as civil disobedience. The protest, he
explains, can never be directed at other agents; it is only available as a challenge to govern-
mental activity.112 This qualification proves, however, unduly restrictive. Brownlee recalls
that even non-governmental private actors act within a legal framework.113 Large corpor-
ations engaging in environmentally harmfully activity usually do so pursuant to law, while
enjoying the panoply of legal protections.114 Obstructing an action directly targets the
private company but also challenges the government’s decision to authorise it; disobedience
expresses a demand upon government to rectify the mistake and a rebuke of a legal frame-
work that authorises and enables these actions.115 Moreover, private actors sometimes
behave in ways that have extensive, even global implications. The behaviour of multi-
national corporations might induce immense environmental harm. Targeting property
associated with such behaviour embodies the repudiation of the company’s failure to
take into account environmental concerns at the expense of the global good. Expediency
might justify damaging public property that is not clearly linked to the protested
conduct but destroying private property with no obvious links to the environmentally
harmful activity is considerably difficult to justify. In general, damage to private property
must be clearly associated with the political communication dissidents seek to propagate.
How does ecotage fare when tested against the safeguarding and the communicative
conditions? Dave Foreman and Bill Haywood, environmental activists and authors of a
practical guide on ecodefence, are adamant that ecotage is never directed at living
things.116 It only targets machines, tools, or other property used to destroy or pollute
the environment. Tactics that negligently caused injury to persons, such as spiking
trees by driving metal spikes into their trunks, a practice that destroys the sawmill
blades and chainsaws used to cut down trees, were promptly disavowed and altered or
abandoned.117 Ecoteurs typically refrain from any risks of injury to human beings. As
such, ecotage generally satisfies the safeguarding rest.
Whether ecotage fulfils the communicative test is more contentious. Some scholars
maintain that the extensive destruction of property is irreconcilable with the communi-
cative character of civil disobedience.118 Far from persuasion, raising the cost of an action
amounts to ‘civil blackmail’: it is a way for a recalcitrant minority to strong-arm the
majority into accepting its own views.119 Dworkin considers such actions coercive and
110Similar issues arise in other areas such as animal welfare activism (see Matthew Humphrey and Marc Stears, ‘Animal
Rights Protest and the Challenge to Deliberative Democracy’ (2006) 35(3) Economy and Society 400).
111William Smith, ‘Disruptive Democracy: The Ethics of Direct Action’ (2018) 69(1) Raisons Politiques.
112Raz (n 6) 264.
113Brownlee (n 7) 19.
114See e.g., ‘Poland Ejects Protesters from Ancient Forest Despite EU Calls to Halt Logging Operation’ Reuters (21 July
2017), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-eu-logging-idUSKBN1A61XY> accessed 27 February 2021.
115See e.g., Glover (n 98) 834–35.
116Bill Haywood and Dave Foreman, Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching (3rd edn, Abbzug Press 1993).
117See e.g., Martin (n 106) 301.
118See e.g., Vanderheiden (n 108).
119Dworkin (n 9) 112. Cf. Rodney Barker, ‘Civil Disobedience as Persuasion: Dworkin and the Greenham Common’ (1992)
40 Political Studies 290. See also Brownlee (n 7) 221; Habermas (n 43) 96; Lefkowitz (n 11) 216.
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thus non-persuasive. Yet he misleadingly lumps together under this category any disrup-
tive or coercive method, ranging from conduct causing inconvenience or delays, such as
blocking a road in front of a coal factory, to destruction of property that directly aims at
raising financial costs.120 It is untenable to maintain that all coercive activities, including
those causing inconvenience, are by definition non-persuasive. In fact, even lawbreaking
directly aiming at raising the costs of an operation may retain its communicativeness and
thus still operate as a persuasive tool. Piero Moraro casts further doubt on the stark dis-
tinction between persuasion and coercion. Actions deemed exemplary cases of persuasive
lawbreaking, such as the occupation of public spaces, remain coercive to some extent. For
Moraro, ‘pure appeals to persuasion… are rare: some form of pressure is usually
present’.121 Indeed, King views the tools of persuasion and coercion –which he associates
with road-blocking and other similar activities undertaken by the US civil rights move-
ment – as complementary, not conflicting.122
For Aitchison, causing inconvenience to others, say by blocking a road, is not coer-
cive.123 He reaches that conclusion because ‘[t]o qualify as coercion, the threatened
action must affect the interests of the target in a way that is significant’.124 The reference
to the extent to which other agents’ interests are affected seems incorrect. Is the road-
block coercive for an agent prevented from going to hospital, but not for an agent
taking a walk? The first agent has a more significant interest in moving unobstructed.
But it is odd to conclude that coercion only manifests in the first case. It is also
unclear how the requirement for a certain degree of obstruction fits with Aitchison’s
general definition of coercion as aiming ‘to influence the behaviour of others through
non-voluntary means’.125 On my proposed model, road-blocking is coercive but non-
violent (assuming it does not risk harm to others) and therefore compatible with civil
disobedience.126 Contrary to Dworkin’s classification, it can still amount to a persuasive
activity.
That ecotage focuses on harm prevention, halting for example the operation of coal-
fired plants in an effort to reduce carbon emissions, is not reason to conclude that it fails
to communicate a political message. Destruction of property harming the environment is
intertwined with, and constitutive of, the political message dissidents attempt to express.
It thus retains a symbolic function.127 The targeted property damage communicates to
civil society and government the injustice of environmentally damaging actions while
also impliedly challenging the state’s complacency when it comes to enacting and enfor-
cing appropriate, environmentally friendly legislation. As long as the political message is
communicated, ensuring that everyone recognises the environmental motivation behind
lawbreaking, ecotage can qualify as civil disobedience.
120Dworkin (n 9) 109–10.
121Moraro (n 81).
122Quoted in Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954–63 (Simon and Schuster Paperbacks 1988)
140.
123Aitchison (n 51) 45.
124ibid.
125ibid.
126Delmas associates extensive disruption with incivility. As such, road-blocking might be uncivil but not civil disobe-
dience (Candice Delmas, ‘Disobedience, Civil and Otherwise’ (2017) Criminal Law and Philosophy 11(1), 43). On my pro-
posal, disruption is compatible with civil disobedience, as long as it does not become violent.
127See e.g., Milligan (n 29) 105.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, I have sought to sketch out the relationship between civil disobedience and
non-violence. Non-violence is traditionally associated with civil disobedience, with thin-
kers and commentators typically perceiving it as the quintessential characteristic of
justified lawbreaking. As I have argued, there are good reasons to expect dissident
groups to avoid violence. But at the same time, some violent actions can be highly com-
municative and can therefore promote civil disobedient ends. Even though any violent
act can be morally justified independently, my investigation evaluates which acts we
can understand as violence can actually be undertaken in civil disobedience.
To distinguish between actions too violent to qualify as civil disobedience and conduct
reconciled with the protest, I have proposed a definition of violence to be used in cases of
politically-motivated lawbreaking. Drawing from criminal law, I suggest that we under-
stand violence as the direct or indirect application of force that intends to or is reckless
about causing harm to people or to property. That harm cannot be trivial, and it cannot
be accidental. This definition means that not every instance of battery will be irreconcil-
able with civil disobedience. And it means that some accidental harm will not disqualify
actions from civil disobedience.
Targeted property damage ordinarily conveys a political communication. Spray paint-
ing the walls of a police-station to protest police brutality, for example, clearly embodies
the dissidents’ political communication. By contrast, when violence against property is
not targeted, it is likely that the lawbreakers’ political message becomes indiscernible
from sheer vandalism. When property damage is extensive and emerges as the only
message out of the protest, lawbreaking reduces, in the public eye, to senseless
destruction.
Social movements like the gilets jaunes maintain a complicated attitude towards vio-
lence. Such groups are diffuse, with some members manifesting greater willingness to use
violence. Some of the group’s symbolic attacks against property are violent but can still
qualify as civil disobedience. Mass clashes with police, however, or the indiscriminate
attacks on property and shops are probably irreconcilable with civil disobedience. The
communicative component of those actions is diminished – neutral observers can only
see violence, not a political activity.
Similar concerns occur when examining attacks against property. Some violence
against property is highly communicative. As such, there are good reasons to see it as
civil disobedience. Other property damage, however, is so extensive that probably falls
beyond the scope of civil disobedience. The crucial test I have proposed is that all
attacks against property must be clearly communicating the political position civil dis-
obedients seek to promote. In recent times, Extinction Rebellion has caused property
damage while also laying a claim to civil disobedience. Most such actions are extremely
communicative and enhance the dramaturgy of the protest, managing extensive access to
the media cycle.128 Yet other actions from the group have been derided as vandalism.129
128‘Extinction Rebellion “Not Sorry” after Wiltshire Chalk Horse Defaced’ BBC News (8 October 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/uk-england-wiltshire-49972467> accessed 27 February 2021. ‘Extinction Rebellion Turns up the Heat on Shell’
Extinction Rebellion (15 April 2019) <https://rebellion.earth/2019/04/15/extinction-rebellion-turns-up-the-heat-on-
shell/> accessed 27 February 2021. For ecotage capturing attention without damaging property see ‘Extinction Rebel-
lion Activists Dress up as Canaries to Block Mine in Protest’ Independent (26 February 2020) <https://www.independent.
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The critical question here is whether lawbreaking represents the dissidents’message. It is
a question of clearly communicating a position. Actions that are perceived as sheer vand-
alism will have a weaker claim to civil disobedience.
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